Showing posts with label binwalk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label binwalk. Show all posts

Monday, February 9, 2015

Firmware Forensics: Diffs, Timelines, ELFs and Backdoors

This post covers some common techniques that I use to analyze and reverse firmware images. These techniques are particularly useful to dissect malicious firmwares, spot backdoors and detect unwanted modifications.

Backdooring and re-flashing firmware images is becoming mainstream: malicious guys are infecting embedded devices and inserting trojans in order to achieve persistence. Recent articles covered the increasing number of trojanized android firmwares and routers that are being permanently modified.

Attackers with a privileged network position may MITM your requests and forge fake updates containing malicious firmwares. Writing Evilgrade modules for this is really simple, as most vendors keep failing to deliver updates securely, right ASUS?

All your HTTP packets are belong to us...
Older versions of ASUS firmwares were vulnerable to MITM attacks (CVE-2014-2718) because it transmitted updates over HTTP and there were no security/signature checks. ASUS silently patched the issue on 3.0.0.4.376+ and they're now verifying RSA signatures via /sbin/rsasign_check.:

Valid signature -> nvram_set("rsasign_check", "1")

NoConName 2014 CTF Finals: Vodka

I'll keep my tradition of writing posts based on CTF challenges because everybody upvotes CTF posts on reddit it's cool.

The challenge "Vodka", from NoConName 2014 CTF Finals was created by @MarioVilas, who kindly provided the files here (thanks dude!).

I did not participate on the CTF finals, but I found the challenge really interesting because there were many different ways to solve it, summarizing the actions needed to audit a compromised firmware. In my opinion, the best CTF challenges are the ones that require us to develop/use new techniques and improve existing tools.

NoConName 2014 Finals: Vodka
Challenge Category: Forensics
Description: No hints :( just get the flag.

This challenge description is not very intriguing, so I hired a couple of marketing specialists to design a new logo add some Infosec drama and reformulate it:

A mysterious bug affected one of the core routers at a major Internet service provider in Syria. The failure of this router caused the whole country to suddenly lose all connection to the Internet. The Syrian government recorded a traffic capture right before the crash and hired you to perform a forensic analysis.

Download provided: https://github.com/MarioVilas/write-ups/blob/master/ncn-ctf-2014/Vodka/vodka


Network Forensics

The download provided is a packet capture using the PCAP-NG format. Wireshark is too mainstream, so let's convert the PCAP-NG to PCAP and open it using Network Miner:



Network Miner makes it very easy for us to understand what's going on: there's some sort of file transfer via TFTP and the filename seems to be related to an OpenWRT firmware image.


Firmware structure

We always binwalk all the things but very few people stop to analyze and understand the firmware structure properly. We know that the firmware image was downloaded using TFTP, a common way used by many routers to transfer config files/updates and it is probably based on the OpenWRT project.

So what does binwalk tell us?



The Commom Firmware Environment (CFE) is a firmware interface/bootloader present on Broadcom SOCs. It is analogous to the BIOS on PC platforms and it is responsible for CPU initialization and bootstrap code on embedded processors. The CFE is also referred as PMON and it is generally mapped to mtd0.

The JFFS2/NVRAM filesystem is the non-volatile partition. They store all the configuration parameters, including router settings, passwords and logs.

Bear in mind firmware updates generally do not include the CFE/NVRAM partition. You can access the CFE console using serial and you can also dump them on a live system using DD or via SPI. Let's focus on the firmware sections included on the provided image (openwrt-wrtsl54gs-squasfs.bin):

TRX (Offset 0x20)

The TRX header is just an encapsulation, describing a series of information from the firmware, including the image size, CRC, flags, version information and partition offsets. Binwalk wasn't recognizing the header and the relative offsets properly so I submitted these two pull requests. Creating custom signatures for binwalk is pretty straightforward.


Some firmwares (like the newer ones from ASUS and Netgear) use this TRX structure but don't include a loader: the Linux Kernel and the RootFS may be shifted on this occasion.


If the firmware includes any extra header before the TRX, you have to sum their size with the displayed partition offsets in order to find the real values. Some firmwares for SOHO modems out there won't include it, so these values should be right on most cases. The downloaded OpenWRT image had the following offsets:

  • Loader: 0x20 + 0x1C = 0x3C
  • Kernel:  0x20 + 0x8D8 = 0x8F8
  • RootFS: 0x20 + 0x7E400 = 0x7E420

In this specific case, we have a BinHeader right before the TRX, indicating the board ID, the FW Date and the Hardware Date. The struct is described on cyutils.h:

This extra header appears on a few routers like the WRT54G series: the Web GUI checks for this pattern before actually writing the firmware.



We are particularly interested on the fwdate field (Firmware Date), composed by the hex values 07 02 03. According to addpattern.c, the first byte defines the year, the second one is the month and the third byte refers to the day the firmware was created. The fwdate seems to be 03-February-2007, save that for later, we will need that =)

GZ'd LZMA Loader (Offset 0x3C)

According to OpenWRT Wiki, the boot loader has no concept of filesystems: it assumes that the start of the TRX data section is executable code.

The boot loader boots into an LZMA program which decompresses the kernel into RAM and executes it. It turns out the boot loader does know gzip compression, so we have a gzip-compressed LZMA decompression program at 0x3C.

You can find the source code for this lzma-loader here and here. Note the TEXT_START offset at 0x80001000: we may need to adjust the Loading Address on our Disassembler in order to reverse the compiled loader. Don't forget to decompress it (gunzip) before reversing the file.


Most embedded toolchains would strip the binaries in order to reduce the firmware size. If you want to reverse a friendlier version of the loader, grab the latest OpenWRT ImageBuilder and search for loader.elf:


Woohoo, blue code =)

Note that if we modify the loader to include a backdoor, we would have our very own Router Bootkit, cool isn't it?

LZMA'd Kernel (Offset 0x8F8)

Instead of just putting a kernel directly onto flash, most embedded devices compress the kernel using LZMA. The boot loader boots into an LZMA program which decompresses the kernel into RAM and executes it.

Binwalk has a signature to find Kernel strings in raw Linux Kernels. The identified string lists the toolchain used to compile the Kernel, as well as the compiled date and version information:


And why did binwalk manage to find all these information from the Kernel? The answer can be found on the toolchain's Makefile:

If we follow the steps from my previous post we can build a customized Kernel for OpenWRT. The generated vmlinux is generally an ELF file, but in our case, the object was stripped using objcopy:

Did you notice the compile date was 03-February-2007? Let's save that for later as well.

SquashFS (Offset 0x72420)

The last part is the actual filesystem. Most embedded Linux devices use SquashFS and many vendors hack it in order to get better compression and faster performance. Hopefully we don't have to worry about that as Sasquatch handles different SquashFS header/compression formats.

The filesystem has the standard OpenWRT directories and files, including a banner from the 0.9 build (White Russian).


Both binwalk and sasquatch display the SquashFS superblock information, including the creation/last append time:


Did you spot the date 29-October-2014? There's definitely something going on here =)


Directory Tree Diff & Fuzzy Hashing

Now that we have unpacked & unsquashed the firmware, let's use binwally to compare the directory tree and find the needle in the haystack.

After googling the filename (openwrt-wrtsl54gs-squashfs.bin), we get three possible candidates:

- https://downloads.openwrt.org/whiterussian/0.9/default/openwrt-wrtsl54gs-squashfs.bin
- https://downloads.openwrt.org/whiterussian/0.9/micro/openwrt-wrtsl54gs-squashfs.bin
- https://downloads.openwrt.org/whiterussian/0.9/pptp/openwrt-wrtsl54gs-squashfs.bin

OpenWRT offers different builds for the same device because of constraints like limited flash size. Let's download these three candidates, unpack and compare them:

binwally.py ctf/_openwrt-wrtsl54gs-squashfs.bin.extracted/ micro/_openwrt-wrtsl54gs-squashfs.bin.extracted/


The "micro" build has the highest overall match score (99%), let's spot the differences:

binwally.py ctf/_openwrt-wrtsl54gs-squashfs.bin.extracted/ micro/_openwrt-wrtsl54gs-squashfs.bin.extracted/ | grep -E -v "ignored|matches"


After carefully reviewing these files, we notice that the "/etc/profile" was modified to include a call to the nc backdoor.


The LZMA'd Kernel (offset 0x8F8) is the same on both images, even though binwally reports a difference. This happens because binwalk extraction doesn't know when to stop and both files also contain additional data like the SquashFS partition.

The backdoor located at "/bin/nc" is a simple bash script that checks the MD5 from "/etc/profile" and draws a Nyan Cat along with the challenge key. In order to get the proper key, we simply modify the file location to the relative path "./etc/banner", to avoid overlapping with the file from the original system.


After running the file, we get the key NCNdeadb6adec4c77a40c23e04770924d3c5b18face.


This was just too easy right? But what if we didn't have a known template for comparison?


Timeline Analysis

My tool of choice to perform timeline analysis is Plaso, created by @el_killerdwarf. The tool is python-based, modular and very fast. What I like most about it is the ease to output results to ELK. If you don't know about Plaso and the ELK stack, read this quick tutorial and set up your environment.

Let's use log2timeline to create a dump file, pointing to the extracted SquashFS path:

log2timeline.py output.dump squashfs-root/


Let's fire up psort and include data in the timeline:

psort.py -o elastic output.dump


That's all, Plaso uses the filestat parser to extract metadata from the files, outputting results to Elasticsearch.

We already identified the following dates from the firmware:

  • 03 February 2007 (??:??:??): BinHeader firmware creation date
  • 03 February 2007 (13:16:08): Linux Kernel compile date
  • 29 October  2014 (16:53:25): SquashFS creation or last append time

First let's filter the filesystem attributes: we just want to display the mtime (modified) timestamp, so we are going to perform a micro analysis to include the value. The filter should be something like this: field must | field timestamp_desc | query: "mtime".


The histogram view is very helpful to get a big picture of what's going on:


We can clearly see that the files included/modified on 2014-10-29 had a malicious nature. The state sponsored attacker did not modify other files from the OpenWRT base image.


At this point it is pretty clear that the firmware was modified using the OpenWRT Image Builder, which is a pre-compiled OpenWrt build environment. The BinHeader and the Kernel timestamps were left untouched and the only partition modified was the SquashFS one.

Of course these timestamps, like any kind of metadata, could be tampered by the malicious hacker. However, they are very helpful during the initial phases, speeding up investigations and narrowing the analysis to a smaller set of data.


ELF Structural Information

I always get impressed when AV vendors manage to profile APT and State-sponsored attackers based on PE timestamps. Techniques like the imphash are generally used exclusively on Windows.

PE Imports are the functions that a piece of software calls from other files (typically DLLs). To track these imports, a hash is created based on library/API names and their specific order within the executable. Because of the way a PE’s import table is generated, we can use the imphash value to identify related malware samples, for example.

Everybody does that for Windows binaries but what about Linux? Virustotal recently included detailed ELF information on their engine. We can also use these sections to identify useful information from the binaries, including the toolchain used to compile them.

We generally don't have any timestamp information on the ELF section, but there are many other interesting fields. This quick guide on using strip summarizes some topics:

When an executable is produced from source code, there are two stages - compilation and linking. Compiling takes a source file and produces an object file. Linking concatenates these object files into a single executable. The concatenation occurs by section. For example, the .comment section for the final executable will contain the contents of the .comment section of each object file that was linked into the executable.
If we examine the contents of the .comment section we can see the compiler used, plus the version of the compiler
It's pretty simple to read and parse the .comment sections from ELF files. GNU readelf (part of binutils) and pyelftools include all the necessary functions parse them.

I always try to display information from object files using different toolchains in order to find out which one understands the file structure properly. On this specific case, I'm going to use mipsel-linux-gnu-readelf (part of Emdebian toolchain), but the regular readelf also does the job.

for i in $(find .) ; do echo $i ; mipsel-linux-gnu-readelf -p .comment $i ; done > comment-section.txt
./lib/modules/2.4.30/diag.o

String dump of section '.comment':
  [     1]  GCC: (GNU) 3.4.4 (OpenWrt-1.0)

./lib/modules/2.4.30/switch-adm.o

String dump of section '.comment':
  [     1]  GCC: (GNU) 3.4.4 (OpenWrt-1.0)

./lib/modules/2.4.30/switch-robo.o

String dump of section '.comment':
  [     1]  GCC: (GNU) 3.4.4 (OpenWrt-1.0)

./lib/modules/2.4.30/switch-core.o

String dump of section '.comment':
  [     1]  GCC: (GNU) 3.4.4 (OpenWrt-1.0)

./lib/modules/2.4.30/wlcompat.o

String dump of section '.comment':
  [     1]  GCC: (GNU) 3.4.4 (OpenWrt-1.0)

Just a few ELF files included the comment section, others got stripped during the compilation/linking phase. If we download OpenWRT 0.9 sources we can see that GCC 3.4.4 was indeed used:


TheMoon Worm exploited a command injection to infect Linksys wireless routers with a self-replicating malware. If we analyze its .comment section, we can see that it was probably compiled and linked using GCC 4.2.4 and 3.3.2. If we search for a .comment section on the router E4200, targeted by the worm, we can't find any reference because the toolchain stripped all of them. Having a file compiled with a different toolchain or containing extra ELF sections (that others files don't) is something highly suspicious.


The .comment section for the final executable includes the contents of the .comment section of each object file that was linked into the executable. If we compare the comment section on ASUS RT-AC87U Firmwares v3.0.0.4.378.3885 and v3.0.0.4.376.2769, we can spot an extra line on the newer version from tfat.ko:


If you want to dump all sections from the ELF file you may use this command line (kind of hacky, but works):

for i in $(find .) ; do echo "$i" ; for j in $(readelf -S "$i" | grep \\[ | cut -d"]" -f2 | cut -d " " -f2 | grep -v "Name") ; do mipsel-linux-gnu-readelf -p "$j" "$i" ; done ; done > list.txt

The output will be a bit too verbose, you may want to narrow the analysis to the following sections:

  • .comment - contains version control information
  • .modinfo - displays information from a kernel module
  • .notes - comments put there by the compiler/linker toolchain
  • .debug - contains information for symbol debugging
  • .interp - contains the name of the dynamic loader

For more information regarding the ELF file structure, check the ELF man and the Chapter 5 from Malware Forensics Field Guide for Linux Systems.


Conclusion

Without further clues or context these information may not be relevant, but in conjunction with other data they're helpful to get a big picture of what's going on:

  • Diffing the content from previous firmwares may be useful to find out when backdoors were first installed, modified and/or removed.

  • Artifact timeline creation and analysis also helps to speed up investigations by correlating the vast amount of information found on system.

  • The contents from the ELF section will likely reveal the toolchain and the compiler version used to compile a suspect executable. Clues such as this are attribution identifiers, contributing towards identifying the platform used by the attacker to craft his code.

We can use the timestamps from the kernel partition to correlate different firmwares from the same family, for example. We can also compare the timestamps from each partition to find deviations: a firmware header created on 2007, with a Kernel timestamp from 2007 and a SquashFS partition dated to 2014 is highly suspicious.

The Firmware.RE project is performing a large scale analysis, providing a better understanding of the security issues related to firmwares. A broader view on firmwares is not only beneficial, but necessary to discover new vulnerabilities and backdoors, correlating different device families and showing how vulnerabilities reappear across different products. This is a really cool project to track how firmwares are evolving and getting security fixes.



Tuesday, December 3, 2013

Binwally: Directory tree diff tool using Fuzzy Hashing

For this post, I'll discuss about the concept of directory tree and binary diffing and how it could be used to find potential vulnerabilities and security issues that were (silently) patched on firmware images.

Silent patching is a big deal as we don't have many security researchers like Spender around. This is a common practice among companies that create software and firmwares for embedded devices. Changelogs from new firmwares often contains few information about security issues, outlining the changes as "bugfixes" or "enhancements": we get no CVE's and we don't know how critical the flaws are.

In addition to that, you may occasionally find some reference for the string 'Ac1db1tch3z' on your code (which means that you got a free vulnerability assessment) or your employee Joel might forget to remove a backdoor from the firmware. Diffing the content from previous firmwares may be useful to find out when these backdoors were first installed, modified and/or removed.

I introduce you to Binwally: a simple script to perform directory tree diffing using the concept of Fuzzy Hashing (ssdeep) to define a matching score between binaries.

Binwally says "no" to Silent Patching

Fuzzy Hashing

Fuzzy Hashing, also know as context triggered piecewise hashes (CTPH), can match inputs that have homologies. Such inputs have sequences of identical bytes in the same order, although bytes in between these sequences may be different in both content and length. The concept was introduced by Andrew Tridgell and the most well-known tool is ssdeep, created by Jesse Kornblum.

The usage example outlined on ssdeep's homepage summarizes it well:
$ ls -l foo.txt
-rw-r--r--   1 jessekor  jessekor  240 Oct 25 08:01 foo.txt
$ cp foo.txt bar.txt
$ echo 1 >> bar.txt

A cryptographic hashing algorithm like MD5 can't be used to match these files; they have wildly different hashes.
$ md5deep foo.txt bar.txt
7b3e9e08ecc391f2da684dd784c5af7c  /Users/jessekornblum/foo.txt
32436c952f0f4c53bea1dc955a081de4  /Users/jessekornblum/bar.txt

But fuzzy hashing can! We compute the fuzzy hash of one file and use the matching mode to match the other one.
$ ssdeep -b foo.txt > hashes.txt
$ ssdeep -bm hashes.txt bar.txt
bar.txt matches foo.txt (64)

The number at the end of the line is a match score, or a weighted measure of how similar these files are. The higher the number, the more similar the files.

Binwally

Binwally is a simple Python script that uses this concept to diff directory trees in order to find different, unique and matching files, displaying an overall score of the results. It was based on diffall.py from the book Programming Python (4th Edition) and it requires python-ssdeep, a wrapper for ssdeep (which is coded in C). You can download the script from my Github, following the link below:


The code is pretty straightforward, it takes two dirs/files as arguments and displays which files are unique, the ones that matches and the ones that differs and their match score. It still needs some improvement (the matching score is based on the number of files and don't consider the filesizes for example) but it works fine for what it purposes to accomplish.


Comparing two directory trees from a firmware unsquased using Binwalk and firmware-mod-kit:


You can already achieve this using Winmerge, but the tool does not display a matching score, it's not command line based and not scriptable. You can check my previous post describing how to use it to differ firmware images.

Binwally is best used with Binwalk, that's why I'll talk to devttys0 to merge it with his tool (maybe a new command line switch under the Binary Diffing options). Binwalk already supports binary diffing (-H switch), but it will just compare files and firmware images. The problem is that firmware images are usually packed, encrypted and/or compressed. When you unpack and compare the extracted files and their directory tree, you have much more valuable information. If you disassemble the code and compare the results again, you get even better data - this is what bindiff from Zynamics/Google does pretty well. The Insinuator blog has a nice example on how to use bindiff for RE.

Binwally Usage: Dissecting DLink Backdoor Patch

So you may have heard recently that some DLink routers had a backdoor and that a security update was issued to address the vulnerability.

According to Bruce Schneier, we should "Trust but verify": that's what we are going to do here. First let's download the backdoored version (v1.13) and the patched version (1.14) from DLink's FTP. Next step is to extract the firmware images (binwalk -e DIR100A1_FW114WWB02.bix DIR100_v5.0.0EUb3_patch02.bix) and compare the directory trees using Binwally:

$ python binwally.py _DIR100_v5.0.0EUb3_patch02.bix.extracted/ _DIR100A1_FW114WWB02.bix.extracted/


I removed the matching files and symlinks for better reading, but the analysis is now narrowed to a small set of files. According to the release notes, a minor PPoE dial up issue was also fixed, that may be the reason why "/bin/pppd" had differences.

Some files like the "/www/Home/bsc_lan.htm" have a matching score of 100 even though they have different content and MD5, for example. This is due to the nature of Fuzzy Hashing, as the small modification was not enough to change the fuzzy hash value. It's important to note that files with a "match" result do actually have the same content and also have a matching score of 100.


There's a new Shell script on the patched 1.14 firmware, located at "/etc/wdhttp.sh". It seems that Joel "do not know how to write sash loop command ugly code":


Busybox was another binary that had a different pattern. Running them using QEMU shows that they still have the same version (v1.0.0-pre2) and different compile dates (2011.09.15 and 2013.10.31).



According to the analysis from devttys0, the binary "/bin/webs" had the backdoor function (if you did not read his analysis yet, read it here). Binwally returned a match score of 0 because it was unable to find similar patterns. The binaries have different sizes and were probably compiled using different toolchains, containing different offsets, as displayed on the diff from Winmerge:


Binwalk from v1.3.0 beta on now displays 3D binary data visualization, so let's have a look on how they differ in a 3D plane:


This is time to use an approach other than byte comparison and fuzzy hashing. Bindiff uses graph-theoretical approach to compare executables by identifying identical and similar functions. We first need to analyze both files using IDA to create the needed IDB files. After inputting both files on bindiff, we notice a high level of similarity on the Call Graphs:


Let's focus on the previously backdoored function "alpha_auth_check":


We can easily spot the difference displaying the flow graph:


Zooming in (courtesy of NSA):



It seems that Joel's "xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide" is gone, say hello to "iNteLalsEtvaLuewitHoutnAme". And yes, it seems that Joel (and the binaries that can re-configure the device's settings) can only access the device from 127.0.0.1 now  =)


Conclusion

Binary and directory tree diffing is a powerful tool for reverse engineering and to find potential compromise of a system as long as you have a "known template". In the context of Embedded Systems, it reveals modified files, settings and directories, narrowing the analysis to a small set of data when analyzing different firmware images.

To all the vendors out there it's important to be transparent on what's being fixed, alerting the end-users about how critical the issues are. And please, leave the backdooring job to the guys who "read the constitution" and are paid for that, OK?

Monday, November 11, 2013

Unpacking Firmware Images from Cable Modems

Hacking Cable modems used to be very popular during the early 2000’s. People like DerEngel and Isabella from TCNiSO carried lots of research on the topic and talks from bitemytaco (R.I.P) and BlakeSelf during DEFCON 16 and DEFCON 18 covered lots of information on the subject.

Securing cable modems is more difficult than other embedded devices because, on most cases, you can’t choose your own device/firmware and software updates are almost entirely controlled by your ISP. Most cable modems offer a limited administrative interface and management commands are sent using SNMP.

Cable Modem Firmware

There are basically three types of firmware images for cable modems:

- Signed and compresed (PKCS#7 & binary)
- Compressed binary images
- RAM dump images (uncompressed & raw)

You can dump your own firmware image using JTAG or sniffing the connection during upgrades, for example. I’m a big fan of binwalk and I always wondered why it doesn't unpack firmwares from popular Broadcom based cable modems so I decided to research on this.

Unpacking the Firmware

For this analysis I’ll use Cisco DPC3925, which is a very common DOCSIS 3.0 modem here in Brazil. Cisco DPC3925 has a BCM3380 chipset, 16MB Flash x 64MB DRAM memory configuration.


The compressed firmware image has around 4MB. Using strings against the file didn't help much and binwalk v1.2.1 (without any additional parameters) did not recognize it.


We can gather lots of useful information from the vendor’s page: user guides, datasheets, licensing information and open source disclaimer for the product. There are no sources available on Cisco's home, but the Copyright Notices section states that the product uses LZMA SDK 4.21.


So we know that the firmware is probably packed using LZMA but we still need to figure out how to unpack it. Binwalk -i displays results marked as invalid during the scan and we might get some clue:


The LZMA header is not well documented. There are some good resources on lzma-purejs Github and you can also check binwalk's magic file signatures (devttys0 already did all the hard work for us).

  Offset Size  Description
    0     1    lc, lp and pb in encoded form
    1     4    dictSize (little endian)
    5     8    uncompressed size (little endian)

The Bootloader in the beggining of the flash contains the necessary information to boot the firmware image. On the top of the firmware there's always an extractor which decompress the firmware into DRAM.

Offset 0x677 is a good candidate because it's located in the beginning of the file and it seems to have a valid header. 5D 00 00 00 01 indicates a LZMA compression level of -8 and the next 64 bits should be the data's uncompressed size (in little endian).


The 64 bits following the header (00 20 20 0E 3A 28 AB EF) is clearly not a valid uncompressed size (2898643604054482944 bytes). It represents the actual compressed data, making binwalk and 7zr unable to extract it.

What we need to do here is append a few extra bytes to the header so our regular 7zr binary can recognize and extract the data. We don't know the uncompressed size for the firmware yet: the good news is that we can append and specify a big value here, allowing 7zr utility to unpack it (although complaining that the EOF was reached too early). Let's specify 268435456 bytes (256MB), convert it to little endian (00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00) and append it to the original LZMA header. The new header should be something like ... 5D 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 20 20 ...

I took the opportunity to have a look on binwalk's API and wrote a simple lzma-unpacker.py:

This code will be obsolete in a couple of days because I'm pretty sure Binwalk incorporate this (a plugin maybe?)


The data was extracted successfully and contains 21982740 bytes. If we replace the uncompressed size on the LZMA header with the correct value in Little Endian (14 6E 4F 01 00 00 00 00), the 7zr tool would not complain about the file integrity.


Most Broadcom cable modems are packed this way, including the ones manufactured by different vendors. The script was fully tested and works fine for the following models:

  - Cisco DPC3925, DPC2434
  - Motorola SB5100, SB5101, SVG6582, SVG1202
  - Thomson ACG905, DCM425, DHG534, DHG544, DWG850, DWG874
  - Webstar DPC2203

Firmware Analysis

Now that you successfully unpacked the firmware, here's a couple of cool things you should do:

- Find default passwords


- Find backdoors



- Pentest the Web Application




- Fingerprint your device and submit to NMAP

- Find similar devices using scans.io dataset

- Mail HD Moore a copy of the firmware and wait for the CVE Spam